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A VIOLATION OF JUS COGENS NORMS AS AN IMPLICIT
WAIVER OF IMMUNITY UNDER THE FEDERAL SOVEREIGN
IMMUNITIES ACT
I. INTRODUCTION
The recent case, Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany,' exem-
plifies the fact that foreign sovereigns are irreproachable in the courts
of the United States for human rights violations perpetrated abroad.
Despite the enactment of the Torture Victim Protection Act2 and the
Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act s (hereinafter "the FSIA"), courts of
the United States lack jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign when it
commits human rights violations against United States citizens and
aliens abroad. This note argues that United States courts could exert
jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign under the FSIA by accepting a
theory of implied waiver of sovereign immunity in cases where a sover-
eign violates human rights."
Mr. Hugo Princz, a Jewish American who suffered in Nazi con-
centration camps during World War II, sued the Federal Republic of
Germany for reparations in the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia in December, 1992.1 Germany moved to dismiss
the action for lack of federal subject matter jurisdiction., The district
court denied the motion to dismiss and Germany immediately appealed
the decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia.7 The Court of Appeals held that if the FSIA8 applied retro-
actively to the events occurring between 1942 and 1945, there was no
exception to the general grant of sovereign immunity under the act.
1. 26 F.3d 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 923 (1995).
2. Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 78 section 2(a) (codified at 28 U.S.C.A. § 1350
note (West 1993)). The Torture Victim Protection Act allows a United States citizen
(or alien) to sue a foreign national for torture or extrajudicial killing, if he acted under
actual authority, or under the color of law of any foreign nation.
3. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-11 (1988). The Sovereign Immunity Act (FSIA) re-
vokes a sovereign's immunity for torts committed within the United States.
4. This theory is based on Judge Wald's dissent in Princz v. Federal Republic of
Germany, 26 F.3d 1166 (1994)(Wald, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 923
(1995) and Adam C. Belsky, et al., Implied Waiver Under the FSIA: A Proposed
Exception to Immunity for Violations of Peremptory Norms of International Law, 77
CALIF. L. REV. 365 (1989).
5. Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 813 F. Supp. 22 (D.D.C. 1992).
6. Id. at 23.
7. Princz, 26 F.3d at 1168.
8. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-11 (1988).
9. Princz, 26 F.3d at 1176.
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Furthermore, the court held that if the FSIA did not apply retroac-
tively, then the pre-FSIA law of sovereign immunity governed. 10 How-
ever, federal jurisdiction was changed after the enactment of the FSIA
to allow diversity jurisdiction over a foreign state only insofar as the
foreign state was not entitled to sovereign immunity under the FSIA. 11
Thus, even if pre-FSIA law applied, the case was not within post-FSIA
federal subject matter jurisdiction because there was no applicable ex-
ception to the general grant of immunity under the FSIA.12 The Court
of Appeals did not decide whether the FSIA applied retroactively or
not because, in either case, Mr. Princz's case lacked federal subject
matter jurisdiction.13 Thus, the Court of Appeals dismissed Mr.
Princz's case against Germany.
However, the majority of the Court of Appeals did not fully con-
sider a finding of federal subject matter jurisdiction based upon an im-
plicit waiver of sovereign immunity under the FSIA. 4 The court could
have established jurisdiction under the FSIA by accepting the theory
that a violation of jus cogens norms"3 constitutes an implicit waiver of
sovereign immunity. The concept of jus cogens recognizes that there is
a fundamental core group of international norms from which sovereigns
may not derogate.16 Genocide, slavery, murder, torture, prolonged arbi-
trary detention, and racial discrimination are violations of jus cogens.1 1
As jus cogens, by definition, is a set of rules from which states may not
derogate, the sovereignty of a state acting in violation of jus cogens
should not be recognized; and, therefore, that state should not be able
to claim sovereign immunity.18 A state that acts contrary to the norms
of jus cogens implicitly waives its rights to sovereign immunity.
In this case, Germany enslaved, tortured, arbitrarily detained, and
10. Id. at 1175.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(1)(a) provides that:
A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the
United States or of the States in any case in which the foreign state has
waived its immunity either explicitly or by implication, notwithstanding any
withdrawal of the waiver which the foreign state may purport to effect except
in accordance with the terms of the waiver.
15. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 102 cmt. k (1987).
16. Adam C. Belsky, et al., Implied Waiver Under the FSIA: A Proposed Excep-
tion to Immunity for Violations of Peremptory Norms of International Law, 77 CALIF.
L. REV. 365, 367 (1989).
17. REATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 702 & cmt. n (1987).
18. Belsky, supra note 4, at 377.
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discriminated against Mr. Princz in contravention of the principles of
jus cogens. This note, therefore, contends that Germany implicitly
waived its privilege of sovereign immunity under the FSIA as a state
violating jus cogens norms. This theory would establish federal subject
matter jurisdiction in Mr. Princz's case and in all other cases where the
individual rights of United States citizens and aliens have been violated
by foreign nations abroad. However, the Supreme Court of the United
States denied Mr. Princz's petition for a writ of certiorari; and, there-
fore, this theory will not be reviewed as it applies to Mr. Princz's
case.19 Furthermore, this note concludes that the Supreme Court will
not find subject matter jurisdiction until Congress explicitly accepts the
theory that a foreign sovereign implicitly waives its immunity when it
violates a principle of jus cogens or Congress amends the FSIA to pro-
vide jurisdiction in cases involving torture, extrajudicial killings, or ge-
nocide committed in a foreign nation.
II. THE CASE
Mr. Princz's parents were naturalized Americans who had re-
turned to their homeland, now called Slovakia, in the early 1900's. 0
Mr. Princz was born in Slovakia, but was a citizen of the United States
by birth. Mr. Princz, his parents, three sisters, and two brothers were
residing in Slovakia when the United States declared war on Nazi Ger-
many in 1942.21 The family was arrested by the Slovak Fascist police,
presented to the German SS, and sent to Camp Maidanek in Poland.2"
Nazi Germany did not acknowledge the validity of the Princz family's
United States passports and barred them from leaving for the United
States as part of the International Red Cross civilian prisoner
exchange. 23
Mr. Princz believes that his parents and sisters were killed in the
concentration camp Treblinka.2 ' While enslaved at Birkenau, Mr.
Princz and his two brothers were leased by the Nazi Germany to the
19. Princz v. Germany, 115 S. Ct. 923 (1995).
20. Nora Frenkiel, The Last Holocaust Victim Trapped in Europe Still Fighting
for Reparations, THE WASH. POST, May 18, 1993, at El.
21. 141 CONG. REC. E681-02, 104th CONG., 1st Sess. (1995)(quoting Eric
Breindel, Germans Stick to "Principle" - And the Price is Decency, N.Y. POST, Jan.
19, 1995.
22. Princz, 813 F. Supp. at 23.
23. S. Res. 162, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). The International Red Cross pro-
gram exchanged Germans living in the United States for Americans living in Nazi
Europe. Princz, 26 F.3d at 1176.
24. Princz, 813 F. Supp. at 23.
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German Chemical cartel I.G. Farben. 8 His brothers were injured and
placed in the hospital where they were intentionally starved to death in
the presence of Mr. Princz2 6 Later, Mr. Princz was sent to a Warsaw
Ghetto Camp and then transferred by death march to Dachau. 7 At
Dachau he was forced to work at the privately owned Messerschmidt
airplane factory.28
As World War II was ending, Nazi Germany tried to destroy in-
criminating evidence of its war crimes by exterminating its slave la-
bor. 9 Mr. Princz was on a death train headed to an extermination
camp when United States Armed Forces intercepted it and liberated
those on board, including Mr. Princz.3 The United States personnel
processing the train's survivors noticed the "USA" stenciled across Mr.
Princz's uniform and sent him to an American military hospital instead
of a center for Displaced Persons so that he might receive better medi-
cal care.3 1 Following his recuperation, Mr. Princz entered communist-
occupied Czechoslovakia to search for family members.32 After he de-
termined that he was the sole survivor of his immediate family, Mr.
Princz went to America for the first time - not speaking a word of
English"3 - to join relatives.3 4
In the early 1950's, Germany established a reparations program
for survivors of the Holocaust.35 Mr. Princz made a timely application,
but was denied eligibility for the pension because he was an American
citizen at the time of enslavement 6 and was never classified as a dis-
placed person, as he was never sent to a Center for Displaced Persons.37
25. Id.
26. Id. at 23.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. S. Res. 162, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Nora Frenkiel, The Last Holocaust Victim; American Trapped in Europe
Still Fighting for Reparations, THE WASH. POST, May 18, 1993, at El.
34. S. Res. 162, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
35. Id.
36. Princz, 813 F. Supp. at 24.
37. Id. The first German compensation act was passed in 1952 to provide repara-
tions to Holocaust survivors. Mr. Princz filed a claim in 1955 and was denied because
of ineligibility. In 1965, the act was amended. Mr. Princz did not file a second claim.
He contends that the amendment only extended the period during which the survivors
could file claims. Id. at 24 n.1. Germany, however, argues that the amendment did
expand the eligibility pool and that Princz's claim was then permissible. Id. Mr.
Princz's attorney maintains that his client would still have been denied if he had ap-
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In 1984, Mr. Princz turned to his federal senator for help in obtaining
payment from Germany.88 The senator sought the assistance of the
United States' Department of State. 9 Germany informed the State
Department that Mr. Princz was not eligible for a pension.40 Then Mr.
Princz sought an ex gratia payment4' from Germany, but the German
Foreign Ministry would not submit the request to the German Parlia-
ment.42 Next Mr. Princz's case was brought before the German Su-
preme Court, which declined to consider it because the statute of limi-
tations for filing claims had run.43 As diplomatic means were of no
avail and the German court system was closed to him, Mr. Princz sued
Germany in the United States District Court for the District of Colum-
bia in 1992.44
Mr. Princz sued for false imprisonment, assault and battery, negli-
gent and intentional infliction of emotional distress, and in quantum
meruit for the value of his labor in the I.G. Farben and Messerschmidt
plants. 45 The United States District Court for the District of Columbia
denied Germany's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdic-
tion in December 1992."' The court held that Germany was estopped
from asserting sovereign immunity under the FSIA. The court reasoned
that Germany, which had failed to recognize and respect both United
States and international law, could not now use United States law as
protection against Mr. Princz's claims.47 "[T]he FSIA has no role to
play where the claims alleged involve undisputed acts of barbarism
committed by a one-time outlaw nation which demonstrated callous
disrespect for the humanity of an American citizen, simply because he
was Jewish." 48 Judge Sporkin, writing for the court, summed up this
plied again. Nora Frenkiel, The Last Holocaust Victim; American Trapped in Europe
Still Fighting for Reparations, THE WASH. POSt, May 18, 1993, at El. The issue,
however, was not before the court.
38. Princz, 813 F. Supp. at 24.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Ex gratia payment is a "payment made by one who recognizes no legal obliga-
tion to pay but who makes payment to avoid greater expense as in the case of a settle-
ment by an insurance company to avoid costs of suit. It is a payment without legal
consideration." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 712 (6th ed. 1990).
42. Princz, 813 F. Supp. at 24.
43. Id. The 1969 statute of limitations for filing pension petitions had run and no
extensions were permitted. Id.
44. Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 813 F. Supp. 22 (D.D.C. 1992).
45. Princz, 26 F.3d at 1168.
46. Princz, 813 F. Supp. at 27.
47. Id. at 26.
48. Id.
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case by saying that it was fundamentally about Germany taking re-
sponsibility for its crimes against Mr. Princz. As Judge Sporkin rea-
soned, this responsibility could not be avoided by using the technicali-
ties of United States' law as a shield against Mr. Princz's claim.
Germany then filed a Motion for Stay of Proceedings pending its ap-
peal of the Court's Order denying Germany's motion to dismiss for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction.' 9 The district court denied Ger-
many's Motion for Stay, stating that it was not necessary to protect the
defendant's rights; as Germany did not plan to contest its responsibility
for the Holocaust, the only remaining issue was the amount of damages
to be awarded. 50 However, the next week the Court of Appeals re-
sponded to Germany's Motion for Stay"1 holding that the district
court's denial of Germany's motion to dismiss on grounds of sovereign
immunity was immediately appealable. 2 Furthermore, it stated that
the Motion for Stay was unnecessary because an appeal properly pur-
sued from the district court's order automatically divests the district
court of control, and the district court may not proceed to trial until
the appeal is resolved. 53 The Court of Appeals had to decide whether
Germany was protected by sovereign immunity under the FSIA and, if
it were, whether Mr. Princz's case had to be dismissed for lack of fed-
eral subject matter jurisdiction.
III. SUMMARY OF THE COURT'S REASONING
The Court of Appeals held that subject matter jurisdiction was
lacking and dismissed Mr. Princz's case against Germany.5 It did not
resolve the question of whether the FSIA applied retroactively or not.
It simply stated that if it did, there was no applicable exception to the
general grant of sovereign immunity. On the other hand, if it did not,
there was no federal subject matter jurisdiction based upon pre-FSIA
law because diversity jurisdiction over foreign states did not apply un-
less there was an applicable exception to immunity under the FSIA. 55
The Supreme Court held in Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess
Shipping Corp.56 that the FSIA "provides the sole basis for obtaining
49. Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, No. 92-0644, 1993 WL 121501
(D.D.C. Apr. 7, 1993).
50. Id. at 2.
51. Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 998 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
52. Id. at 1.
53. Id.
54. Princz, 26 F.3d. at 1176.
55. Id. at 1168.
56. 488 U.S. 428 (1989).
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jurisdiction over a foreign state in federal court. '57 Under the FSIA
the general presumption is that a sovereign is entitled to immunity sub-
ject only to limited exceptions. The Supreme Court has not ruled on
whether it applies retroactively to events before its promulgation in
1976. The lower courts are split on this issue. The Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia avoided making a definitive ruling about
FSIA's retroactive application. However, the district court stated that
there is good reason to believe that it should apply retroactively. In the
FSIA's declaration of purpose, Congress declared that, "Claims of for-
eign states to immunity should henceforth be decided by courts of the
United States and of the States in conformity with the principles set
forth in this chapter."58 This declaration suggests that the FSIA should
be applied to all cases decided after its enactment regardless of when
the underlying events of the cases took place.59 Moreover, after the
FSIA was enacted, Congress repealed the portion of 28 U.S.C. § 1332
that provided for diversity jurisdiction over suits brought by a United
States citizen against a foreign government.6 Thus, it appears that
Congress intended all questions of sovereign immunity to be decided in
conjunction with the FSIA. It is unlikely that Congress meant to extin-
guish silently all suits against foreign sovereigns based on the pre-FSIA
facts.61
Yet the Court of Appeals noted that the application of the FSIA
to the pre-FSIA facts might not even be considered retroactive after
the Supreme Court's decision in Landgraf v. U.S.L Film Products.62
There the Court held that a statute is retroactive only when it "would
[not] impair rights a party possessed when he acted, [would] increase a
party's liability for past conduct, or [would] impose new duties with
respect to transactions already completed."6 Here the issue is one of
subject matter jurisdiction. It does not affect the substantive rights of
the defendant, but the power of the court to hear the case. However,
the court refused to rule on the matter of retroactivity because even if
the FSIA does apply to the pre-FSIA events, the Court of Appeals
found no exception to sovereign immunity under the FSIA applicable
to Mr. Princz's case. According to the Court of Appeals, Germany en-
joys sovereign immunity under the FSIA.
57. Id. at 439.
58. 28 U.S.C. § 1602.
59. Princz, 26 F.3d. at 1170.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. -U.S.-, 114 S. Ct. 1483 (1994).
63. 114 S.Ct. 1505.
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The Court of Appeals held that none of the exceptions to FSIA
divested Germany of sovereign immunity. An exception under
§ 1605(2)(a) of the FSIA provides that a foreign sovereign "shall not
be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the United States or of
the States in any case ... in which the action is based ... upon an act
outside the territory of the United States in connection with a commer-
cial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct
effect in the United States."" The court did not rule on whether leas-
ing prisoners as slave labor constituted commercial activity under the
FSIA.65 Instead, it denied that such activity had a direct effect in the
United States. The court defined a direct effect as "one which has no
intervening element, but, rather, flows in a straight line without devia-
tion or interruption."66 The court determined that Mr. Princz's work
for I.G. Farben and Messerschmidt did not have any direct impact in
the United States. 17 Furthermore, the court said that Germany's use of
the United States' postal, wire, and banking system to deliver repara-
tions did not constitute a direct effect as the delivery of reparations is
not an immediate consequence of Mr. Princz's enslavement." Lastly,
the court thought that the effects of Mr. Princz's enslavement were
directly felt in Poland and Germany where he labored and in Czecho-
slovakia where he resided immediately after the war before coming to
the United States.69 According to the court, his suffering in the United
States was not sufficient to constitute a direct effect under the FSIA.
7 0
Thus, the Court of Appeals held that even if leasing Mr. Princz for
slave labor was a commercial act, there was no direct effect suffered in
the United States, the establishment of which was necessary for juris-
diction under § 1605(2)(a).
The Court of Appeals also held that there was no exception to
sovereign immunity under § 1605(1)(a) of the FSIA.7 1 This section
provides that a foreign state will not be immune if it has "waived its
64. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(2)(a).
65. Princz, 26 F.3d at 1172.
66. Id. (quoting Upton v. Empire of Iran, 459 F. Supp. 264, 266 (D.D.C. 1978),
affid mem. 607 F.2d 494 (D.C. Cir. 1979)).
67. Princz, 26 F.3d at 1172.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1173.
70. See Martin v. Republic of South Africa, 836 F.2d 91, 95 (2d Cir. 1987). The
court held that permanent injuries suffered by an African American because he was
denied emergency care while in South Africa did not constitute a direct effect within
the United States. Many courts have made similar rulings.
71. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(1)(a).
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immunity either explicitly or by implication. ' 2 The court rejected the
theory that a violation of jus cogens constitutes an implicit waiver of
sovereign immunity under the FSIA .7  The court dismissed this argu-
ment because there are no cases supporting it and there is one case that
rejects the theory in its dicta.7' Furthermore, the court argued that the
theory is inconsistent with the requirement imposed by several courts
that the implicit waiver be intentional.7 5 The Court of Appeals found
no justification for holding that Germany implicitly waived its sover-
eign immunity because Germany never indicated its amenability to
suit.76
Section 1604 of the FSIA states that a foreign sovereign's immu-
nity from suit is "[slubject to existing international agreements to
which the United States [was] a party at the time of enactment of [the
FSIA]."7 Mr. Princz argued that Nazi Germany's acts were in contra-
vention of the Hague Convention. Article 52 of the Hague Convention
provides that citizens of an occupied country may not be ordered to
"tak[e] part in military operations against their own country" and a
"belligerent party which violates [this prohibition] shall, if the case de-
mands, be liable to pay compensation. ' 78 From the Nuremberg Trial
decision it is clear that Nazi Germany violated the Hague Conven-
tion. 9 Mr. Princz contended that the compensation provision of the
Hague Convention conflicted with the FSIA; and, therefore, Germany
was not immune because of the prior existing Hague Convention."
However, the Supreme Court held that an international convention that
"only set[s] forth substantive rules of conduct and state[s] that com-
pensation shall be paid for certain wrongs ... [does] not create private
72. Id.
73. Princz, 26 F. 3d at 1173.
74. Although no case adopts the theory that a violation of jus cogens principles
constitutes an implied waiver of sovereignty, the Ninth Circuit in dicta has denounced
the idea. Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 719 (9th Cir.
1992). The court said that the FSIA does not specifically provide for an exception to
sovereign immunity based on a violation of jus cogens. The court determined that Con-
gress must explicitly state that a violation of jus cogens principles constitutes an im-
plicit waiver of immunity.
75. Princz, 26 F.3d at 1173.
76. Id. at 1174.
77. 28 U.S.C. § 1604.
78. Princz, 26 F.3d at 1174 (quoting Article 52 and 3 of the Hague Convention).
79. Id. at 1175 (noting 6 F.R.D. 69, 123 (1946)). The Nuremberg Trial decision
officially declared that Nazi Germany's acts were in violation of the Hague Conven-
tion. Id.
80. Princz, 26 F.3d at 1174.
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rights of action." 8' The courts have unanimously held that the Hague
Convention does not by implication grant individuals a personal right
to damages. 82 Thus, the Court of Appeals reasoned that the treaty ex-
ception to sovereign immunity was inapplicable.
Therefore, the Court of Appeals did not need to decide whether
the FSIA applies retroactively or not because it held that there was no
relevant exception to sovereign immunity. Furthermore, the court held
that even if it did not apply retroactively, there was no subject matter
jurisdiction. Federal diversity jurisdiction over a case brought by a
United States citizen against a foreign state used to be provided by 28
U.S.C. § 1332. However, with the enactment of the FSIA the jurisdic-
tion under § 1332 was expressly repealed. Instead, the new § 1330(a)
provides federal jurisdiction over a suit against a foreign state only
when the foreign state is not entitled to immunity under the FSIA. The
House Report on the FSIA declared that "since jurisdiction in actions
against foreign states is comprehensively treated by the new § 1330, a
similar jurisdictional basis under § 1332 becomes superfluous."83 As
there is no immunity under the FSIA, there is no subject matter juris-
diction under § 1330. Thus, the court did not have to consider the sta-
tus of sovereign immunity law pre-FSIA as there was no post-FSIA
federal subject matter jurisdiction.
Thus, the Court of Appeals concluded that since there was no ex-
ception to the FSIA's general grant of sovereign immunity and no sub-
ject matter jurisdiction if FSIA did not apply to pre-FSIA facts, Mr.
Princz's case against Germany for compensation had to be dismissed.
IV. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. The Development of the Restrictive Theory of Sovereign
Immunity
The Supreme Court addressed the issue of sovereign immunity for
the first time formally in The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon.84
81. Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 442
(1989)(footnote omitted).
82. See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 810 (D.C. Cir. 1984),
Dreyfus v. Von Finck, 534 F.2d 24, 30 (2d Cir. 1976), and Handel v. Artukovic, 601
F. Supp. 1421, 1425 (C.D. Cal. 1985).
83. Princz, 26 f.3d at 1170 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
1976, at 14 (1976)).
84. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812). Two Americans filed a complaint in admi-
ralty in the District Court of the United States for the District of Pennsylvania against
The Schooner Exchange, a ship that was temporarily berthed in Philadelphia's harbor.
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Chief Justice Marshall fathered the legal principle that a foreign sover-
eign, barring extraordinary circumstances, is immune. He stated that
"[t]he jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is necessarily
exclusive and absolute. It is susceptible of no limitation not imposed by
itself."85 However, he continued, since all states are of "perfect equal-
ity and absolute independence"'8 6 and benefit from mutual exchange,
nations must consent to a relaxation of their absolute jurisdiction. Na-
tions should grant sovereign immunity to each other. Accordingly,
there is no right to sovereign immunity, but states voluntarily waive
their jurisdiction over foreign states. As the Supreme Court later said it
is a matter of "grace and comity on the part of the United States, and
not a restriction imposed by the Constitution. ' 87 The Schooner Ex-
change philosophy crystallized into a doctrine of absolute sovereign im-
munity for foreign states. 88
Sovereign immunity was of limited importance at the time of The
Schooner Exchange. The contact between sovereigns was related to po-
litical and governmental acts. Chief Justice Marshall named the com-
mon examples of interaction which, in turn, engendered the immunity
of a nation upon foreign territory: troops passing through;89 vessels
seeking shelter from the sea;90 the person of the sovereign was ex-
empted from arrest;91 and foreign ministers, likewise, were free from
arrest.92 Yet, with the increase of business between nations, disputes
developed between trading states and individuals of other nations.
Id. at 116. The Americans claimed that the ship belonged to them and that it had been
seized by agents of Napoleon, the Emperor of France, when it was on route from Balti-
more, Maryland to St. Sebastians, Spain. Id. The Schooner Exchange had become a
warship in the service of France. Id. at 146. The Executive Department of the United
States government intervened, claiming that France was an ally and, therefore, im-
mune to suit. Id. at 116. Chief Justice Marshall reasoned that the French warship had
entered the port to escape the stress of weather and that friendly ships were so author-
ized. Id. at 141. Thus, The Schooner Exchange was immune because it was simply
claiming its "rites of hospitality." Id. at 144. Chief Justice Marshall held that "na-
tional ships of war, entering the port of a friendly power open for their reception, are to
be considered as exempted by the consent of that power from its jurisdiction." Id. at
145-46.
85. Id. at 136.
86. Id. at 137.
87. Verlinden v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 486 (1983).
88. Belsky, supra note 4, at 379.
89. Id. at 139.
90. Id. at 141.
91. The Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. at 137.
92. Id. at 138.
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When these trading states were held immune, the results were unfair. 93
Thus, a new theory developed that was more restrictive than the philos-
ophy espoused in The Schooner Exchange. Under this theory, immu-
nity was granted only when a sovereign's public acts were assessed, and
when a nation traded, it performed a private act. Therefore in trade
cases, the sovereign was treated as a private party, and there was no
automatic right to immunity.94
In the first half of the twentieth century, the restrictive theory of
sovereign immunity gained international acceptance. 95 Thus, immunity
only extended to public acts of nations and not to private acts such as
commerce. The Department of State formally recognized the restrictive
theory of sovereign immunity in 1952.96 The private acts of a sovereign,
which primarily are commercial activities, were not entitled to immu-
nity.97 The Department of State advised the courts on a case-by-case
basis on whether immunity should be granted to a sovereign." If the
Department of State neglected to indicate whether a particular state
should be immune, the courts had to surmise how the Department
would have decided. 99 As the courts were not given concrete legislative
standards for determining when to assert jurisdiction and when to
waive it,100 the body of law became confusing and unpredictable.
In 1976, the FSIA was enacted by Congress to combat the confu-
sion and to codify the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity. The
FSIA states,
Subject to existing international agreements to which the
United States is a party at the time of enactment of this Act a
foreign state shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the
93. Belsky, supra note 4, at 380.
94. Id.
95. Princz, 26 F.3d at 1169.
96. Id. In 1952, Jack Tate, the Acting Legal Advisor of the State Department,
sent a letter to the Acting Attorney General announcing that the State Department
was adopting the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity. Siderman de Blake v. Re-
public of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 705 (9th Cir. 1992). This letter is referred to as the
Tate Letter.
97. Id.
98. Id. Shades of this policy were visible at the time of the decision The
Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812). The Executive De-
partment of the United States government intervened on behalf of France and claimed
that France, as an ally, was immune from jurisdiction within the United States. Id. at
116.
99. Siderman de Blake, 965 F.2d 705.
100. Id.
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courts of the United States and of the States except as provided
in sections 1605 to 1607 of this chapter. 10 1
The general legal principle of The Schooner Exchange remains; foreign
sovereigns are immune when acting within a political or governmental
scope. However, at the time of The Schooner Exchange, it was the
domestic sovereign who voluntarily waived its jurisdiction over the for-
eign sovereign. Under the FSIA, the foreign sovereign has a statutory
right to immunity unless its activities fall within one of the excep-
tions.' 02 The exceptions primarily concentrate on commercial activities
where a foreign sovereign is acting as an individual. Furthermore, as
noted earlier, the new section providing for jurisdiction over foreign
states, 28 U.S.C. § 1330, echoes the FSIA. Federal diversity jurisdic-
tion exists only when the foreign state is not entitled to immunity under
the FSIA.
To maintain a suit under the FSIA there must be both federal
subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction over the foreign
nation. Federal subject matter jurisdiction exists if there is no immu-
nity under one of the FSIA's exceptions. 03 Personal jurisdiction over a
foreign state, subject to the Due Process clause's requirement of mini-
mum contacts, exists whenever subject matter jurisdiction exists and
process has been served in accordance with the FSIA.'04 Once these
101. 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (1994).
102. 28 U.S.C. § 1605 sets out the exceptions to immunity. In broad terms, the
exceptions to immunity are: (1) a foreign state waives its immunity either explicitly or
by implication; (2) an action is based on the commercial activity of the foreign state
within the United States; or upon an act performed within the United States in connec-
tion with the commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere; or outside the United
States with a direct effect in the United States; (3) expropriation in violation of inter-
national law; (4) the dispute is over rights in real property and estates located within
the United States; (5) the action is based upon noncommercial torts occurring in the
United States; (6) an arbitration agreement between a foreign state and private party
is at issue; and (7) an action is in admiralty to enforce a maritime lien, which is based
upon a commercial activity of the foreign state, against a vessel or cargo of a foreign
state.
103. 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a). In actions against foreign states:
[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction without regard to amount
in controversy of any nonjury civil action against a foreign state as defined in
§ 1603(a) of this title as to any claims for relief in personam with respect to
which the foreign state is not entitled to immunity either under sections 1605-
1607 of this title or under any applicable international agreement.
104. 28 U.S.C. § 1330(b). "Personal jurisdiction over a foreign state shall exist as
to every claim for relief over which the district courts have jurisdiction under subsec-
tion (a) where service has been made under § 1608 of this title." Id.
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two requirements are met, the FSIA allows a United States citizen or
alien to sue a foreign sovereign for commercial activity that occurs
abroad with direct effects felt within the United States. 10 It also per-
mits a United States citizen or alien to sue foreign sovereigns for torts,
including gross abuses of human rights, that the foreign sovereigns
commit within the United States. 10 6 However, currently the FSIA does
not allow a United States citizen or alien to sue a foreign sovereign for
torts, including gross violations of human rights, perpetrated by the for-
eign sovereign abroad.
Nonetheless, there are remedies for United States citizens and
aliens suing not defendant nations, but foreign nationals for torts, in-
cluding the violations of human rights, that they commit under actual
or apparent authority or under the color of law of a foreign nation. The
plaintiff can sue under the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991.101 It
provides,
An individual who, under actual or apparent authority, or color
of law, of any foreign nation -
(1) subjects an individual to torture shall, in a civil action,
be liable for damages to that individual; or
(2) subjects an individual to extrajudicial killing shall, in a
civil action, be liable for damages to the individual's legal
representative or to any pursuant who may be a claimant
in an action for wrongful death.
The Torture Victim Protection Act also requires that the remedies of
the nation where the tort occurred be exhausted before suing in a
United States district court'0 8 and imposes a ten-year statute of
limitation. 0 9
If the plaintiff is an alien, the plaintiff may also be able to sue
under the Alien Tort Claims Act."0 That act provides that "district
courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for
a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of
105. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(2)(a).
106. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(5)(a). See Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 488 F. Supp. 665
(D.D.C. 1980) and Liu v. Republic of China, 892 F.2d 1419 (9th Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 27 (1990).
107. Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 78 § 2(a) (codified at 28 U.S.C.A. § 1350
note (West 1993)).
108. Id. at § 2(b).
109. Id. at § 2(c).
110. 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
VIOLATION OF JUS COGENS NORMS
the United States.""' The Supreme Court held in Argentine Republic
v. Amerada Hess Shipping that if the defendant is a foreign nation,
jurisdiction must be established under the FSIA and not under the
Alien Tort Claims Act." 2 However, the court did not negate the estab-
lishment of jurisdiction over a defendant national under the Alien Tort
Claims Act."' A foreign national who violates a "law of nations,"
which means a principle of international law or a United States treaty,
may be liable under the Alien Tort Claims Act." 4 Thus, the Torture
Victim Protection Act of 1991 and the Alien Tort Claims Act provide
jurisdiction for the redress of a violation of human rights, but only
when the defendant acts as an individual and not when the defendant is
a foreign sovereign. There is no forum within the United States for an
action against a foreign sovereign who committed a tort abroad that
violated the human rights of a United States citizen or alien.
B. The Emergence of Jus Cogens
After World War II, the doctrine of jus cogens emerged. Jus
cogens is a special subset of customary international law. Normal cus-
tomary international law, like a treaty, is based on the consent of the
participating nations."' A state is not bound by customary interna-
111. 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
112. 488 U.S. 428, 438 (1989).
113. Id.
114. In re Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos Human Rights Litigation, 978 F.2d
493, 499 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2960 (1993). In Filartiga v. Pena-
Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2nd Cir. 1980), the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held
that the Alien Tort Claims Act established jurisdiction over a tort claim brought by
two citizens of Paraguay against a former Paraguayan police inspector for the torture
and death of a family member in Paraguay. The Court of Appeals held that torture
violated the laws of nations. It concluded:
that deliberate torture perpetrated under color of official authority violates
universally accepted norms of the international law of human rights, regard-
less of the nationality of the parties. Thus, whenever an alleged torturer is
found and served with process by an alien within our borders, § 1350 provides
for federal jurisdiction.
Id. at 878. This case, generally, has been accepted. However, it has been questioned
whether the Alien Tort Claims Act can be used by plaintiffs to establish jurisdiction
when the tort has been committed abroad absent a specific cause of action by Congress.
See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984)(Bork, J. con-
curring), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 103 (1985). The alien can avoid this uncertainty by
suing under the Tortured Victim Protection Act. For a general discussion, see S. Rep.
102-249, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
115. Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 715 (9th Cir.
1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1812 (1993).
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tional law if it does not consent to the law.116 Jus cogens norms are also
referred to as peremptory norms, and they are peremptory because they
''prevail over and invalidate international agreements and other rules of
international law in conflict with them. '1 117 Peremptory norms are de-
fined as "norm[s] accepted and recognized by the international com-
munity of states as a whole as ... norm[s] from which no derogation is
permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of
general international law having the same character."11 8
Jus cogens norms are binding on all states whether or not the
states consent to them. 1 9 "A state that enters the international system
after a practice has ripened into a rule of international law is bound by
that rule."12 Peremptory norms are derived from fundamental, inter-
national values from which no state can derogate. A state violates jus
cogens if it:
practices, encourages, or condones (a) genocide, (b) slavery or
slave trade, (c) the murder or causing the disappearance of in-
dividuals, (d) torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment or punishment, (e) prolonged arbitrary detention, (f)
systematic racial discrimination, or (g) a consistent pattern of
gross violations or internationally recognized human rights.12" '
Violations of jus cogens are, in short, violations of human rights.
C. Jurisdiction Under the FSIA When the Tort Occurs Within the
United States
Section 1605(5)(a) of the FSIA provides that a foreign state will
not be immune in a case
in which money damages are sought against a foreign state for
personal injury or death, or damage to or loss of property oc-
curring in the United States and caused by the tortious act or
omission of that foreign state or of any official or employee of
that foreign state while acting within the scope of his office or
employment; except this paragraph shall not apply to -
116. Id.
117. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 102 cmt. k (1987).
118. Siderman de Blake, 965 F.2d at 714 (quoting Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, art. 53, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 332).
119. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 102 cmt. d (1987).
120. Id.
121. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §102 cmt. k (1987).
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(A) any claim based upon the exercise or performance or
the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function
regardless of whether the discretion be abused, or
(B) any claim arising out of malicious prosecution, abuse
of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or in-
terference with contract rights.
According to the House and Senate Judiciary Committees, this provi-
sion was "directed primarily at the problem of traffic accidents but is
cast in general terms as applying to all tort actions for money dam-
ages."" ' The courts have applied this section of the FSIA to non-traffic
torts occurring within the United States. There is nothing in its lan-
guage to suggest a more limited interpretation.
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia con-
sidered jurisdiction under § 1605(a)(5) of the FSIA in Letelier v. Re-
public of Chile.'23 In 1976, Orlando Letelier, the former Chilean Am-
bassador to the United States, was assassinated in a car explosion in
Washington D.C. His survivors brought suit in 1978 against the Re-
public of Chile."2 4 They alleged jurisdiction under § 1605(5)(a). Lete-
lier's death was a tort occurring within the United States. The survi-
vor's claim was not subject to the two exceptions which revoke
jurisdiction under § 1605(5)(a). The claim clearly did not arise out of
"malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresenta-
tion, deceit, or interference with contract rights." ' 5 The survivors'
claim was valid.
The second exception provides that immunity will not be revoked
if the claim is "based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to
exercise or perform a discretionary function regardless of whether the
discretion be abused." ' A discretionary act is one in which "there is
room for policy judgment and decision.' 2 7 The court noted that plan-
ning an assassination is an act involving policy judgment and deci-
sion."2 8 However, a state possesses no discretion that allows its officials
122. Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 488 F. Supp. 665 (D.D.C. 1980)(quoting H.R.
Rep. No. 94-1487 and S. Rep. No. 94-1310).
123. Id.
124. Id. at 665.
125. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(5)(a)(B). The court did not spend much time reflecting on
this first exception. Letelier, 488 F. Supp. at 673.
126. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(5)(a)(A).
127. Letelier, 488 F. Supp. at 673 (quoting Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S.
15, 36 (1953)).
128. Id.
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and employees to commit illegal actions.129 Thus, "whatever policy op-
tions may exist for a foreign country, it has no 'discretion' to perpetrate
conduct designed to result in the assassination of an individual or indi-
viduals, action that is clearly contrary to the precepts of humanity as
recognized in both national and international law."' 30 The court, there-
fore, held that Chile was not entitled to sovereign immunity under the
FSIA for the tortious acts it committed in violation of human rights
within the United States contrary to the principles of international law.
In 1984, Henry Liu, a Taiwanese dissident was shot to death in
California by agents of the Republic of China. His wife brought suit
against China in the United States District Court for the Northern
District of California. The district court conditionally held that China
was not immune under the FSIA in Liu v. Republic of China.'3' "The
killing of Americans residing in the United States is not a policy option
available to foreign countries."'3 2 However, the district court ultimately
dismissed the action on state doctrine grounds.133 The district court
reasoned that inquiry into the Republic of China's involvement in the
assassination would challenge findings of Chinese tribunals, and discov-
ery would "involve [intrusion of] the judiciary in the most sensitive ar-
eas of a foreign nation's national security and intelligence affairs."' 34
Liu's wife immediately appealed this decision to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The Court of Appeals held
that the state doctrine did not bar the action. 35 The Court of Appeals
quoted Letelier: "[T]o hold otherwise would totally emasculate the pur-
pose and effectiveness of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act .... , 6
The Court of Appeals found that the Republic of China was involved
in the conspiracy and that the assassin acted within the scope of his
employment when he killed Liu. No sovereign immunity based on dis-
cretionary acts was granted, and China was denied immunity under
§ 1605(5)(a).
129. Id. (citing Cruikshank v. United States, 431 F. Supp. 1355, 1359 (D. Haw.
1977)).
130. Id.
131. Liu v. Republic of China, 642 F. Supp. 297 (N.D. Cal. 1986).
132. Id. at 305.
133. Liu v. Republic of China, 892 F.2d 1419 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 113 S.
Ct. 27 (1990).
134. Id. at 1421-22.
135. Id. at 1434.
136. Id. at 1432 (quoting Letelier, 488 F. Supp. 674).
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D. No Jurisdiction When Tortious Conduct Occurs Outside the
United States
There was no jurisdiction when a Mr. Martin, an American, who
was denied emergency care after an automobile accident in South Af-
rica, tried to sue South Africa.13 7 Mr. Martin was abandoned at the
scene of the accident, allegedly because he was African American. As a
direct result of his abandonment, he became a quadriplegic. Mr. Mar-
tin tried to establish jurisdiction under § 1605(2)(a) of the FSIA. This
section provides that a foreign state shall not be immune when "an
action is based . . . upon an act outside the territory of the United
States in connection with commercial activity of the foreign state else-
where and that act causes a direct effect in the United States."138 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held in Martin
v. Republic of South Africa that there was no direct effect within the
United States. The court reasoned that the initial injury that left Mr.
Martin a quadriplegic happened outside the U.S.13 9 and the pain and
suffering that Mr. Martin continued to endure in the United States
were only indirect consequences."" Therefore, the court dismissed the
case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction."'
During the Falkland War, an Argentine aircraft, without cause or
provocation, repeatedly attacked a neutral, unarmed Liberian oil
tanker in international waters. 42 The tanker suffered severe damage
and had to be scuttled.143 Argentina refused to pay compensation to the
Liberian owners for the loss of the tanker."' The Argentine courts
were closed to the owners. Therefore, the owners brought an action and
maintained suit in the United States. 45 The district court dismissed the
suit, holding that Argentina was immune under the FSIA.' 4 The
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed. It held that although
the exceptions to FSIA were inapplicable, the Alien Tort Claims Act" 47
137. Martin v. Republic of South Africa, 836 F.2d 91 (2nd Cir. 1987).
138. Id. at 93 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1605(2)(a) (emphasis added)).
139. Id. at 94.
140. Id. at 95.
141. Id. at 96.
142. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argentine Republic, 830 F.2d 421, 423
(2d. Cir. 1987).
143. Id.
144. Id. at 424.
145. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argentine Republic, 638 F. Supp. 73
(S.D.N.Y. 1986), rev'd, 830 F.2d 421 (1987), cert. granted, 485 U.S. 1005 (1988).
146. Id.
147. 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
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provided jurisdiction.148 The United States Supreme Court granted cer-
tiorari to examine the issue of jurisdiction.1 49 It held in Argentine Re-
public v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. that the FSIA provided the
sole basis for obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign state in United
States courts.' 50 According to the Supreme Court's ruling, all actions
against a foreign state must come within the FSIA.
The Court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction under the
FSIA.' 5 ' It held that there was no exception to sovereign immunity. 52
The tort exception of § 1605(5)(a) is limited to damages or loss of
property occurring within the United States. The Court noted that this
bombing took place in the international waters. Furthermore, the Court
stated that there is no exception to the FSIA under § 1604 which pro-
vides that a foreign state shall not be immune if an existing interna-
tional agreement so demands. 153 The Geneva Convention on the High
Seas and the Pan-American Maritime Neutrality Convention were not
self-executing agreements which created "private rights of action for
foreign corporations to recover compensation from foreign states in
United States courts."' 54 Moreover, according to the Court, the con-
ventions and the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation be-
tween the United States and Liberia did not constitute a waiver of im-
munity to suit in the United States or to the availability of a cause of
action in the United States.' 5 Thus, the Supreme Court reasoned that
the Liberian owners were left without remedy.
In 1982, an Argentine family, the Sidermans (whose members
were permanent residents of the United States) filed suit against the
Republic of Argentina.' 56 After the Argentine military overthrew the
government of President Maria Estela Peron in 1976, ten masked men
acting under the direction of the new government beat and tortured
Mr. Jose Siderman.5 1 The family fled. They were forced to sell their
127,000 acres of land at a discount and their business was expropri-
ated.' 58 The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held
148. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 830 F.2d at 428-29.
149. Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428 (1989).
150. Id. at 434.
151. Id. at 429.
152. Id. at 443.
153. 28 U.S.C. § 1604.
154. Amerada Hess, 488 U.S. at 442.
155. Id. at 443.
156. Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1992),
cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1812 (1993).
157. 965 F.2d at 703.
158. Id. at 703-04.
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that there might be jurisdiction under the FSIA in Siderman de Blake
v. Republic of Argentina.159
The court held that torture is a violation of jus cogens norms:
The right to be free from official torture is fundamental and
universal, a right deserving of the highest status under interna-
tional law, a norm of jus cogens. The crack of the whip, the
clamp of a thumb screw, the crush of the iron maiden, and....
the shock of the cattle prod are forms of torture that interna-
tional order will not tolerate. To subject a person to such hor-
rors is to commit one of the most egregious violations of the
personal security and dignity of a human being.160
The court, however, denied jurisdiction based upon a violation of jus
cogens norms.16" ' The court referred to the decision in Amerada
Hess,"6 2 in which the Supreme Court refused to deny immunity to Ar-
gentina who acted in violation of international law.1 63 The court quoted
Amerada Hess stating "that immunity is granted in those cases involv-
ing alleged violations of international law that do not come within one
of the FSIA's exceptions."' 64 The court concluded that Congress would
expressly have to make violations of jus cogens principles an implicit
waiver of sovereign immunity.
The Court of Appeals established that there might be jurisdiction
in Siderman de Blake because Argentina may have waived its sover-
eign immunity under § 1605(a)(1), which allows a foreign state to
waive its immunity implicitly.' 65 Argentina had elicited the help of
California state courts in obtaining jurisdiction over Jose Siderman in a
malicious criminal proceeding against him in Argentina. The Califor-
nia state courts, unaware of the true nature of the proceedings, effected
service of process against Jose Siderman. 66 Thus, Argentina by seeking
the help of the American legal system, contemplated the involvement
of the United States courts in the affairs at issue. 67 The Court of Ap-
peals concluded that the family had presented evidence sufficient to
159. Id. at 722.
160. Id. at 717.
161. Id. at 719.
162. Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428 (1989).
163. Id. at 443 (1989).
164. Siderman de Blake, 965 F.2d at 719 (quoting Amerada Hess, 488 U.S. at
436).
165. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1).
166. Siderman de Blake, 965 F.2d at 722.
167. Id. at 720.
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support a finding that Argentina implicitly waived its sovereign immu-
nity.1 68 However, the case was remanded to allow Argentina to rebut
the family's evidence. 69
The United States Supreme Court again analyzed the FSIA in
Saudi Arabia v. Nelson.17 0 Pursuant to a contract signed with the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Hospital Corporation of America re-
cruited American personnel to work for the King Faisal Specialist Hos-
pital (hereinafter the "Hospital") in Saudi Arabia.171 Mr. Nelson no-
ticed a job advertisement placed by the Hospital Corporation of
America in a trade periodical, applied for a position as a monitoring
systems engineer, and was hired.' Mr. Nelson did not experience any
problems in his new position from December 1993 until March 1994.'"
Then he discovered safety defects in the Hospital's oxygen and nitrous
oxide lines that posed fire hazards and other dangers to the patients. 17
He reported the defects for seven months and was repeatedly told to
ignore them. 7 5 Yet, in September 1984, he was summoned to the Hos-
pital's Security office where agents of the Saudi Government arrested
him.17 6
Mr. Nelson was confined in a jail cell for four days, shackled,
beaten, tortured, and deprived of food. 177  He was not told of the
charges against him or the contents of the statement he was forced to
sign.' 78 He was then transferred to a rat-infested, overcrowded prison
to await trial.179 He was released thirty-nine days later at the request
of a United States Senator. 8 ' Mr. Nelson then brought an action
against Saudi Arabia alleging intentional torts including battery, un-
lawful detainment, wrongful arrest and imprisonment, false imprison-
ment, inhuman torture, disruption of normal family life, and infliction
of mental anguish.' 8' He tried to establish jurisdiction under
§ 1605(2)(a) which denies immunity when "the action is based upon a
168. Id. at 722.
169. Id.
170. 113 S. Ct. 1471 (1993).
171. Id. at 1474.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 1475.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 1475-6.
VIOLATION OF JUS COGENS NORMS
commercial activity carried on in the United States by the foreign
state." 8 Mr. Nelson contended that the Hospital's recruitment in the
United States for American personnel was the "but for" cause of his
injuries. 83
The Supreme Court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction
under the FSIA. 184 The Court reasoned that it was not Saudi Arabia's
commercial activities within the United States, but its tortious conduct
within Saudi Arabia that caused Mr. Nelson's injuries and formed the
basis of his suit.18  The Court went on to say that "[t]he conduct boils
down to abuse of the power of its policy by Saudi Government, and
however monstrous such abuse undoubtedly may be, a foreign state's
exercise of the power of its police has long been understood for pur-
poses of the restrictive theory as peculiarly sovereign in nature." '86 Ac-
cording to the Court, the exercise of police powers is not an act of an
individual involved in commerce, but of a sovereign; therefore it is de-
serving of absolute immunity. In fact, from the Court's holding it ap-
pears that there will never be jurisdiction based on § 1605(2)(a), the
commercial activities exception, when there is a violation of human
rights. 87
In DeNegri v. Republic of Chile, 8 8 two Chilean families living in
exile, one in the United States and one in Canada, sued the Republic of
Chile and the Armed Forces of Chile for the injuries to their children.
Rodrigo Rojas DeNegri and Carmen Gloria Quintana Arancibia were
in Chile in July 1986 and participated in a student protest.'89 They
were subsequently detained by a group of Chilean soldiers, doused with
gasoline, set on fire, and beaten by the soldiers. 190 They were then de-
nied adequate medical assistance; DeNegri died, and Arancibia was
permanently maimed. 19' The families sued Chile for violating "basic
international mandates prohibiting the violation of peremptory human
182. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(2)(a).
183. Nelson, 113 S. Ct. at 1476.
184. Id. at 1473.
185. Id. at 1478. "Those torts, and not the arguably commercial activities that
preceded their commission, form the basis for the Nelsons' suit." Id.
186. Id. at 1479.
187. "[Tjhe Act's commercial-activity exception is irrelevant to cases alleging
that a foreign state has violated human rights." Id. at 1480 (citing Kenneth C. Ran-
dall, Federal Courts and the Human Rights Paradigm 93 (1990)).
188. 1992 WL 91914 (D.D.C. Apr. 6, 1992).
189. Id. at 1.
190. Id. at 1.
191. Id.
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rights norms." '
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dis-
missed the case for lack of jurisdiction under the FSIA. 198 Tort claims
against foreign states are permitted only when the tortious act and the
injury have happened within the United States. Furthermore, Chile
had not waived its immunity through the signing of a treaty or interna-
tional agreement.1 94 The court also refused to accept the theory that
Chile implicitly waived its immunity by violating principles of jus
cogens. 95 It noted that this theory is unsupported by case law, and that
while not discussed in Amerada Hess, the Supreme Court has strictly
interpreted the FSIA.19" The court concluded that Congress would
have to declare officially that the FSIA revokes sovereign immunity
when a peremptory norm has been violated.197
Yet, jurisdiction in In re Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos Human
Rights Litigation was successfully established.1 98 Ms. Marcos-Manotoc
was the National Chairman of the Kabataang Baranggay (which con-
trolled the police and military intelligence personnel) in the Philip-
pines.1 99 She gave a speech at an open forum discussion on August 31,
1977, where she was questioned by Archimedes Trajano about her ap-
pointment as director of an organization.0 0 Trajano was then kid-
napped, interrogated, and tortured to death by the military intelligence
personnel under order from Marcos-Manotoc for his political beliefs
and activities. 0 1 Trajano's mother, who lived in Hawaii, brought suit
against Marcos-Manotoc for the wrongful death of her son.20 2
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit deter-
mined that the FSIA did not apply. Ms. Marcos-Manotoc, who con-
trolled the police and the military intelligence personnel who tortured
and murdered Trajano, acted outside the mandate of her office. 2 3
Therefore, although the FSIA's definition of a foreign state includes an
"agency or instrumentality of a foreign state," 0 Ms. Marcos-Manotoc
192. Id.
193. Id. at 4.
194. Id. at 3.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. 978 F.2d 493 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2960 (1993).
199. Id. at 495.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 495-96.
202. Id. at 495.
203. Id. at 496, 498.
204. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a).
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was not entitled to immunity under the FSIA. She had acted under her
own authority and not under the authority of the Republic of the Phil-
ippines.20 5 Thus, the Alien Tort Claims Act20 6 provided jurisdiction
over Marcos-Manotoc °7 All the requirements for jurisdiction were
present: Trajano's mother was a resident alien, and the torture commit-
ted was a violation of the laws of nations.20 8
As the Letelier and Liu cases demonstrate, it is not difficult to
establish jurisdiction under the FSIA over a foreign sovereign when the
case is based upon a tort that occurred in the United States. The Tor-
ture Victim Protection Act provides jurisdiction in a cause of action
brought by a United States citizen or alien if the defendant is a foreign
national whose acts of torture and extrajudicial killing were committed
under actual or apparent authority or the color of law of a foreign na-
tion. In re Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos Human Rights Litigation
establishes that there is jurisdiction when an alien brings suit against a
foreign national who acted outside of his or her office under the Alien
Tort Claims Act, although the tort has no nexus to the United States.
However, when a violation of human rights is committed by a foreign
sovereign abroad, jurisdiction cannot be established.
V. ANALYSIS
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
held that Germany was immune from the claims of Mr. Princz.20 9 It
declined to hold whether the FSIA applies retroactively to pre-FSIA
facts, but stated that such a determination was irrelevant to the case as
no exception to sovereign immunity under FSIA was applicable. Fur-
thermore, the court stated, if FSIA were not retroactive, there could be
no diversity jurisdiction under § 1330 upon which to base a pre-FSIA
action. Therefore, Mr. Princz's claims were dismissed.
205. In re Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos Human Rights Litigation, 978 F.2d at
493, 498 (9th Cir. 1992).
206. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 which provides "[t]he district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the
law of nations or a treaty of the United States."
207. In re Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos Human Rights Litigation, 978 F.2d at
501. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected the argument that there is no
private right of action because the torture had no nexus with the United States. It,
instead, looked at the face of the statute that indicated "no limitations as to the citizen-
ship of the defendant, or the locus of the injury." Id. at 500. The case follows the
holding in Filartiga. The nationality of the parties is irrelevant.
208. Id. at 498. See supra text accompanying notes 107-09 for the statutory
language.
209. Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
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However, the court could have held that a foreign state that vio-
lates a jus cogens norm surrenders its right to immunity because no
sovereign may derogate from these peremptory norms. While acting in
violation of jus cogens norms, the sovereignty of the state is not recog-
nized. Thus, it implicitly waives immunity under § 1605(1)(a) of the
FSIA. Judge Sporkin of the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Columbia did not find Germany immune. 1 He distinguished
Mr. Princz's case against Germany from Amerada Hess. He held that
Mr. Princz's case involved "extraordinary facts" that were not before
the Supreme Court when it determined the Amerada Hess case, and
were not contemplated by Congress when it enacted the FSIA.21 ' The
case is one of first impression. Congress could not have intended to
allow Germany, which did not recognize Mr. Princz's United States
citizenship in 1942, to raise United States law now as a shield against
liability. 2 Such a result is unjust.
Yet, the Court of Appeals declined to apply what they called an
"expansive reading" of the FSIA and to establish jurisdiction based on
an implicit waiver of sovereign immunity because Germany violated pe-
remptory norms.2 13 Justice Wald dissented from the Court of Appeal's
dismissal of Mr. Princz's case.214 She thought that the FSIA did apply
retroactively to pre-FSIA facts. 1 5 She reasoned that the declaration of
purpose in FSIA states that "[c]laims of foreign states to immunity
should henceforth be decided by courts of the United States and of the
States in conformity with the principles set forth in this chapter." '216
The "henceforth" clearly implies Congress's intent that all cases
against foreign states be decided in compliance with the FSIA, regard-
less of when the events occurred.
Furthermore, she noted that Germany could not have expected to
be held immune from its acts. The Nuremberg trials show that Ger-
210. Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 813 F. Supp. 22 (D.D.C. 1992).
211. Princz, 813 F. Supp. at 26.
212. Id.
213. Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d at 1166, 1174.
"We think that something more nearly express is wanted before we impute to
the Congress an intention that the federal courts assume jurisdiction over the
countless human rights cases that might well be brought by the victims of all
the ruthless military juntas, presidents-for-life, and murderous dictators of the
world, from Idi Amin to Mao Zedong."
Id. at 1174 n. 1.
214. Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166 (1994)(Wald, J., dis-
senting), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 923 (1995).
215. Id. at 1178.
216. 28 U.S.C. § 1602.
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many was held responsible for its atrocities in the pre-FSIA era. 1 7
Moreover she reasoned that the application of FSIA to pre-FSIA facts
would not impinge on any right held by Nazi Germany at the time of
its enslavement and imprisonment of Princz. FSIA deals with the juris-
diction of the courts, not the rights of foreign states.2 18
Justice Wald embraced the theory that a violation of jus cogens
norms constitutes an implied waiver of sovereign immunity under the
FSIA § 1605(l)(a).219 She would find jurisdiction because Germany
waived its sovereign immunity by "violating the jus cogens norms of
international law condemning enslavement and genocide."22 She
poignantly wrote,
When the Nazis tore off Princz's clothes, exchanged them for a
prison uniform and a tattoo, shoved him behind the spiked
barbed wire fences of Auschwitz and Dachau, and sold him to
the German armament industry as fodder for their wartime la-
bor operation, Germany rescinded any claim under interna-
tional law immunity from this court's jurisdiction.221
Germany intentionally waived its right to sovereign immunity and was
on notice that it might be subject to jurisdiction within the United
States when it inflicted unimaginable atrocities on innocent people dur-
ing the Holocaust.222
Furthermore, international law has been a part of the law of the
United States since the early 1900s.221 The Supreme Court has held
that "[a]n act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the
law of nations if any other possible construction remains. The prin
ciples of jus cogens can be reconciled with the FSIA if a violation of
peremptory norms is held to constitute an implicit waiver of immunity
by the foreign state. The very horror of human rights violations puts
the offending foreign state on notice that it will be subject to jurisdic-
tion within the United States.
If this argument is not accepted by the courts, then victims of
human rights violations committed abroad by foreign sovereigns are
217. Princz, 26 F.3d at 1178.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 1184.
220. Id. at 1179.
221. Id. at 1182.
222. Id. at 1184.
223. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
224. The Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804).
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left without a means of compensation within the United States' legal
system. The Torture Victim Protection Act only provides jurisdiction
when the defendant is a foreign individual and not a foreign sovereign.
When the plaintiff is an alien the Alien Tort Claims Act confers juris-
diction over foreign individuals, but not over foreign states.225 A foreign
state should not be allowed to violate human rights abroad and then
claim immunity in United States courts based on American law.
Moreover, the FSIA allows foreign nationals to bring suit in the
United States courts against their native countries for acts of terrorism
occurring within the United States.2 6 Courts have held that acts of
terrorists are in violation of United States and international laws and,
therefore, receive no immunity.22 There is no reason to distinguish
these cases from those occurring abroad where American citizens'
rights are violated in contravention of jus cogens norms.2 8 Jurisdiction
under FSIA should be extended to these cases. The courts of the
United States have a legitimate interest in resolving claims involving its
citizens. Furthermore, the United States would not be subjecting the
foreign sovereigns to its own law, but to international law, the princi-
ples of jus cogens from which sovereigns may not derogate.
There could be problems if the United States embraces the theory
that a violation of peremptory norms is an implicit waiver of immunity
under the FSIA. 22 1 The most glaring is the fact that the right to en-
force a judgment under the FSIA is extremely limited. Section 1610(a)
allows the execution of a judgment on assets of a foreign sovereign only
if the assets were used for the commercial activity upon which the
claim was based.230 Thus, although the FSIA establishes jurisdiction
over a foreign sovereign in both commercial and tort actions, only the
commercial creditors can execute a judgment. Even if the theory of
implied waiver based on a violation of peremptory norms is accepted,
recovery is not guaranteed. The successful plaintiff must depend on
diplomatic and political pressure to enforce judgments." 1 This incon-
gruity needs to be addressed by Congress, but is no reason to reject the
225. Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428 (1989).
226. See Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 488 F. Supp. 665 (D.D.C. 1980); and Liu
v. Republic of China, 892 F.2d 1419 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 27
(1990).
227. Id.
228. See Belsky, supra note 4, at 400-01.
229. See id. at 402-12.
230. 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a).
231. However, political and diplomatic measures have been to no avail in Princz's
situation. It is questionable how successful these methods are in executing judgments.
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theory of an implicit waiver of sovereign immunity based on a violation
of peremptory norms.
Another problem might be that, if the United States takes a more
stringent stance on sovereign immunity, it is possible that foreign states
will be likely to establish jurisdiction over the United States based on
its actions abroad.2 2 Perhaps "there is nothing inherently wrong with
subjecting the United States to liability abroad."2 ' The United States
should be held accountable for its transgressions of peremptory norms.
In any event, regardless of the United States' fears that justice is not
available in a foreign jurisdiction, attachment of U.S. assets could hap-
pen with or without the acceptance of a more limited view of sovereign
immunity." 4
There is also the fear that if the United States opens its courts to
suits based on the implied waiver of sovereign immunity, there will be a
flood of litigation.2 3 5 However, this fear is not realistic; the require-
ments for a valid action are substantial. First, there must be a violation
of a peremptory norm. Peremptory norms occupy a high status among
the norms of international law, 236 and, therefore, very few actions will
involve these norms. Secondly, there are many domestic restrictions on
such suits. The plaintiff must establish personal jurisdiction and venue,
and the defendant may move to dismiss for forum non conveniens2 3 7
Thus, given the narrow definition of jus cogens principles and the do-
mestic legal restrictions, there will not be a flood of cases.
The courts have been reluctant to find an implied waiver except in
the situations mentioned in the legislative history of the FSIA: "(1)
where a foreign state agrees to arbitrate in the United States; (2)
where a foreign state agrees its contract will be governed by United
States law; and (3) where a foreign state files a responsive pleading
with a United States court without asserting sovereign immunity."2 88
Otherwise, the courts hold that the intentionality requirement for
waiver is lacking. The Supreme Court has interpreted strictly the FSIA
in Amerada Hess and declined to discuss the possibility of an implied
waiver based on a violation of peremptory norms. Furthermore, in Nel-
son, the Court was explicit that police power was within the realm of
232. Belsky, supra note 4, at 404.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Siderman de Blake, 965 F.2d at 715-16.
237. See In re Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos Human Rights Litigation, 978
F.2d at 500 and Belsky, supra note 4, at 405-412.
238. DeNegri, 1992 WL at 3.
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sovereign activity and not within the powers of an individual engaging
in commerce. 239 Since the principle behind the FSIA is that a sovereign
will be denied immunity only when it acts as an individual, it seems
that an abuse of police power in violation of a citizen of the United
States or an alien's human rights is strangely within the province of a
sovereign and irreproachable in the United States courts.
Congress has not considered the theory that a violation of jus
cogens principles is an implicit waiver of immunity, although it has
considered amending the FSIA. It has thought about amending the
FSIA to include another exception that would establish jurisdiction in
cases where
money damages are sought against a foreign state for the per-
sonal injury or death of a United States citizen occurring in
such foreign state and caused by torture or extrajudicial killing
of that citizen, or by an act of genocide committed against the
citizen, by such foreign state.24
The plaintiff would have to be a citizen of the United States at the
time the tort was committed, remedies would have to be exhausted in
the place where the conduct giving rise to the claim occurred, and there
would be a ten year statute of limitations in which to bring the suit.241
The other amendment to the FSIA would allow execution of a judg-
ment against property in such an action regardless of whether the prop-
erty was involved in the act upon which the claim was based.242 Thus, a
citizen of the United States would be able to sue and enforce a judg-
ment against a foreign sovereign for a violation of human rights. The
United States House of Representatives' Committee on the Judiciary
examining these amendments supported them because they believed
that "the right of a U.S. citizen to be compensated by a foreign govern-
ment for torture is at least as important as the right to sue a foreign
government for breach of contract. 2 4 The committee was referring to
the unjust fact that the FSIA currently establishes jurisdiction for com-
mercial actions occurring in a foreign territory with direct effects felt in
the United States, but not for violations of United States citizens'
human rights perpetrated abroad.
239. Nelson, 113 S. Ct. at 1478-79.
240. H.R. REP. No. 103-702, 103d Cong., 2nd Sess. 1 (1994). The new section
would be 28 U.S.C. § 1605(7)(a).
241. Id. The new section would be 28 U.S.C. § 1610(7)(a).
242. Id. at 2.
243. Id. at 3.
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The committee also concluded that the amendments would not af-
fect the comity between the United States and foreign nations because
the amendments required an exhaustion of adequate remedies abroad
before action could be brought in the United States.244 Furthermore,
this requirement would insulate the United States courts from non-
meritorious and frivolous suits.245 The ten year statute of limitations
also would ensure that the United States courts would not hear stale
actions . 46 The committee was not worried about an increased exposure
of the United States to suit abroad; it noted that after the Letelier
decision (which subjected a foreign nation's intelligence agency to suit
in the United States), there has not been any known case alleging tor-
ture or assassination against the CIA or any other agency of the
United States Government. 7 If such a case were to arise, there is suf-
ficient recourse within the United States court system for such ac-
tions.2 46 However, despite the warm reception to the amendments by
the Committee on the Judiciary, Congress as a whole has not enacted
these amendments.2 49 Furthermore, these amendments would not pro-
vide an analogous right to aliens, allowing them to sue foreign sover-
eigns for violations of their human rights.
VI. CONCLUSION
The issue of sovereign immunity and its relation to subject matter
jurisdiction under the FSIA is disputed. The Supreme Court was ada-
mant in Amerada Hess that Congress did not intend to provide for
jurisdiction under the FSIA every time there was a transgression of
international law.250 On the other hand, the Court was not considering
the extraordinary facts of Mr. Princz's case or even a case in which an
American citizen's human rights were violated by a foreign sovereign.
Such an act in contravention of jus cogens, the highest of international
laws, may drive the Court to accept the theory that an act in contra-
vention of peremptory norms is an implied waiver of sovereign immu-
nity under the FSIA. However, it appears more likely that the Court is
244. Id. at 5.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id. (quoting the Senate testimony of Mr. Sofaer on Jun. 21, 1994).
248. Id.
249. 140 CONG. REc. E2123-01, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) (quoting Kimberly
J. McLarin, Hope Fading for Holocaust Survivor's Reparations, THE N.Y. TiMES,
Oct. 3, 1994). See H.R. REP. No. 103-702, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1994).
250. Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 436
(1989).
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waiting for Congress to accept explicitly the theory that a violation of
peremptory norms constitutes an implied waiver of sovereign immunity
by amendin the FSIA.
Mr. Princz's petition for a writ of certiorari in his suit against
Germany was denied.251 The amendments to the FSIA (providing juris-
diction to the United States district courts in cases involving torture or
extrajudicial killing committed abroad and allowing execution of judg-
ments) have not been enacted. Neither the Torture Victim Protection
Act of 1991 nor the Alien Tort Claims Act provides any redress for
Mr. Princz's claims. Therefore, without legal redress against Germany,
Mr. Princz filed a suit against the successors to I.G. Farben and Mes-
serschmidt, four German companies, that had made him and his broth-
ers slave laborers during World War 11.252
House and Senate resolutions25 were unanimously adopted in
early 1995 to encourage President Clinton and the Secretary of State
to raise Mr. Princz's case with Germany, but to no avail.2 54 The Ger-
man government refused to make good again on Mr. Princz's claim.2 55
However, on September 19, 1995, a settlement was finally reached be-
tween the United States and Germany.2 56 Mr. Princz and ten other
Americans, mostly children of European parents treated as European
nationals when they were taken prisoner by the Nazis, will share a
$2.05 million settlement. 257 The money will be apportioned according
251. Princz v. Germany, 1994 WL 664731 (U.S. Jan. 15, 1995). There were three
questions presented for review. The first was procedural asking whether the district
court's order denying Germany's motion to dismiss was immediately appealable under
the collateral order doctrine and would the proceedings below then be stayed. The sec-
ond asked if a violation of jus cogens principles is an implicit waiver under the FSIA.
The third question was whether Mr. Princz's slave labor used in the war effort against
the United States in World War II constituted commercial activity with a direct effect
in the United States within the meaning of § 1605(2)(a). Supreme Court Proceedings;
Cases Docketed; Subject Matter Summary of Cases Recently Filed, U.S. Law Week,
Jan. 3, 1995.
252. Lyle Denniston and Mark Matthews, Germany to Pay Camps' Survivors,
THE BALTIMORE SUN, Sept. 19, 1995, at Al.
253. H. R. Res. 323, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1994) and S. Res. 162, 103d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1994).
254. H. R. Res. 323, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1994) and S. Res. 162, 103d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1994). "It ... urges them to take all appropriate steps necessary to ensure
that this matter will be expeditiously resolved and that fair reparations will be provided
Mr. Princz." Id.
255. Id. The German word for reparations, Wiedergutmachung, means to make
good again.
256. 141 CONG. REC. S14802-02, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
257. Lyle Denniston and Mark Matthews, Germany to Pay Camps' Survivors,
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to the severity of suffering, taking into account the length of imprison-
ment, injuries, and other indignation. 8 Mr. Princz's lawsuit against
the German companies has been dismissed by mutual agreement and
the settlement does provide an undisclosed payment to Mr. Princz by
these companies.28 9 Thus, Mr. Princz's battle for reparations from Ger-
many that was begun in the 1950's is complete.2 60
The settlement is not binding on anyone who could raise similar
claims and did not join the agreement.26' The settlement provides that
in two years the governments will begin new negotiations to address
claims of other survivors who may exist.262 While, thankfully, survivors
of Nazi Germany's atrocities are being compensated, there are still no
legal means to ensure such compensation. Victims of human rights vio-
lations committed abroad by foreign sovereigns must rely on political
means to bring settlement. The courts of the United States will not
establish jurisdiction based upon the theory of implied waiver for ac-
tions involving violations of human rights under the FSIA. Foreign sov-
ereigns are irreproachable for these violations in the courts of the
United States. Their violations against the human rights of United
States citizens and aliens will not be redressed within the legal system
of the United States unless Congress expressly states that the FSIA
denies immunity when a foreign sovereign breaches peremptory norms
because the sovereign implicitly waives its immunity, or until Congress
amends the FSIA to provide jurisdiction for torture, extrajudicial kill-
ing, or genocide committed abroad by a foreign sovereign against
United States citizens and aliens.
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